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THE MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL -

ITS LEGAL

STATUS AND THE EFFECT OF DECISIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
MILITARY APPEALSt
FRANK FEDELE*

It is axiomatic that no statute can provide all the numerous details
expected to be encountered in the administration of any judicial system.'
In providing for the courts-martial system, Congress, in Article 36 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, has therefore authorized the PresidentO to issue regulations prescribing the detailed procedure to be fol* Captain, U.S.A.F. Member of the Bars of the Supreme Court of the United States,
the United States Court of Military Appeals, and the State of Nev York.
t This article is a portion of a thesis entitled "The Evolution of the Court-Miartial
System and the Role of the United States Court of Military Appeals in Military Law"
submitted to the Faculty of the Law School of the George Washington University in
partial satisfaction of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science
(SJ.D.).
The creation of the United States Court of Military Appeals represents unquestionably
the most outstanding innovation in the field of military law brought about by the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice which became effective on 31 May 1951.
The establishing of a civilian court to act as final appellate tribunal in the military justice hierarchy marks the introduction of an entirely new concept to the court-martial procedure-that of placing part of the administration of military law in the control of
civilians who are entirely separate from and independent of the Department of Defense, except for administrative purposes.
This civilian "supreme court" for the review of court-martial convictions was by no
means an instantaneous development. Its roots lie in the slow, gradual, and almost imperceptible growth of the concept of appellate review in the military justice system. The
primary object of the parent dissertation was to examine, analyze, and evaluate the role
played by this Court during the first twenty-eight months of its nascent existence (from
31 May 1951 to 3 October 1953); to appraise its effect on military law; and to pose
some of the problems that have arisen as a result thereof. The current article is confined to a discussion of the effect that the Court's decisions have had upon the Manual for
Courts-Martial.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the official opinion
or policy of the Office of The Judge Advocate General, United States Air Force, the
Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other Department or
Agency of the United States Government.
1. ".... The complexities of law enforcement have disclosed the inadequacies of legLslative regulation to a degree which has impelled legislatures themselves to confer on executive and administrative departments the authority to make 'rules and regulations' in an
endeavor to make the enforcement of the law actually achieve the policy intended. Thus
the making of rules and regulations by executive and administrative departments becomes
not a matter of law enforcement but of secondary law creation." I Sutherland Statutory
Construction 11-12 (3d ed., Horack, 1943).
2. Congress, having set up the legal structure for military justice, delegated to the
President the authority to finish the task by providing the procedural rules within the

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

lowed before military tribunals, including the manner of proof and rules
of evidence.3
The regulations of the President which implement the Uniform Code
4
are issued in the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 195 1.
Unlike the procedural rules of civil courts, the Manual covers the operation of the entire courts-martial system, from the initial steps to be
taken before trial to the completion of the case. It deals fully with
the various crimes and offenses, the evidence which can be used to prove
them, and the sentences which can be imposed. It, in effect, declares
much of the military law in advance, not for any specific case but for
all cases which may arise in the future.5 In form it not only resembles
a text or compdndium of military law, but in substance it has become the
"bible of military justice"0 and is used as such by all persons having
any dealings with military justice, including the accuser, convening
authority, counsel, law officer, court-members, 7 investigating officer, reframework of the Uniform Code. United States v. Merritt (No. 53), 1 USCMA 56, 1 CMR
56, 61-62 (1951).
3. The granting to the President of such broad discretionary powers was not without
opposition. See Hearings before House Committee on Armed Services on H. R. 2498,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 756, 1014-1019, 1061-1064 (1949). Article 56 of the Uniform Code
also empowers the President to establish maximum limits of punishment.
4. Promulgated by Exec. Order No. 10214, 16 Fed. Reg. 1303-1419 (1951). The first
Manual for Courts-Martial was a semi-official publication issued by authority of the
Secretary of War in 1896 for use in the Army as an implementation of the Articles of
War of 1874. Murray, Manual For Courts-Martial (1896). The first official Manual
was published two years later-A Manual For Courts-Martial And Of Procedure Under
Military Law (1898). This was followed by the revised 1901, 1905, and 1908 Manuals.
Thereafter followed the 1917 Manual, which implemented the Articles of War of 1916;
the 1928 Manual, which implemented the Articles of War of 1920; and the 1949 Manual,
which implemented the Revised Articles of War of 1948.
S. The declaration of law in advance for similar cases which may arise in the future
is legislative and not judicial power. This method of declaring the law is a hangover
from the concept of Roman Law and is at variance with our common law idea of laws
built up by judicial precedents, unvexed and unaided by legislation. See Page, A Study
in Comparative Law, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 349, 352-370 (1919).
6. TM 27-255, Military Justice Procedure 4 (1945). United States v. Hemp (No. 290),
1 USCMA 280, 3 CMR 14, 19 (1952). The Court of Military Appeals has, from the first,
"emphasized that the Manual for Courts-Martial constitutes the military lawyers' vade
mecum-his very Bible." United States v. Drain (No. 4510), 4 USCMA 646, 648, 16
CMR 220, 222 (1954).
7. As a matter of practice, each member on a general or special court is usually supplied with a copy of the Manual for his use and guidance during the course of trial, Although this doubtful practice, not authorized by statute or regulation, is not entirely free
from question, the practice has become so deeply imbedded in the system that It is seriously doubted whether a change can be brought about in the absence of an express statutory mandate to the contrary. The use of the Manual by the court-martial in closed
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viewing authority, and the members of the Boards of Review.
Since the provisions of the Manual are lawmaking in nature, one of
the first questions to arise is: What legal force and effect does it enjoy?
Article 36 of the Uniform Code partially answers the question by expressly providing that the President may prescribe procedural rules
"generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States
district courts, but which shall not be contrary to or inconsistent with
this code!" Thus, it is abundantly clear that if a provision of the
Manual is in conflict with a provision of the Uniform Code, the latter
will prevail. In such event the Manual provisions would have no legal
force or binding effect.
This principle was first exemplified in the case of United States v.
LaGrange"wherein two accused were tried and convicted by a special
court convened by an officer, junior in rank to that of the accuser. The
commanding officer of the accused, a Navy captain in rank, having
signed the charge sheet as the accuser, was thereby disqualified to act
as the convening authority. He thereupon forwarded the charges to his
superior officer in the chain of command, who in turn directed trial by
a special court and designated a certain Commander in rank as authority to exercise jurisdiction and appoint the court. By virtue of
this authority, the Commander acted as convening authority and appointed the court which tried the accused. On appeal, a Navy Board
of Review reversed the conviction on the ground that the Commander
was not authorized to appoint the court. The Judge Advocate General
of the Navy certified the case to the Court of Military Appeals on the
sole question of whether an officer, junior in rank to the accuser and
not in the normal chain of command, had authority to appoint the
court. The determination of this question required the resolution of a
patent inconsistency between the provisions of the Uniform Code and
those of the Manual.
Article 23 (b) of the Uniform Code provides that when the convening authority of a special court is an accuser, the court shall be convened by "superior" competent authority. This provision is amplified
by paragraph 5a(3) of the 1951 Manual which states in pertinent part:
"When any commander who would normally convene the general court-martial is
the accuser in a case, he shall refer the charges to a superior competent authority

who will convene the court or designate another competent authority to exerdse
jurisdiction."9

session has been approved. CM 353183, Phillips, 9 CAM 186 (1952), reversed on another
ground, United States v. Phillips (No. 1244), 3 USCMA 137, 11 CAIR 137 (1953).
7a. Italics supplied.
S. (No. 313), 1 USCMfA 342, 3 CMR 76 (1952).
9. Italics supplied. This provision of the Manual is made applicable to special courts
by paragraph 5b(2) of the Manual.
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The inconsistency is readily apparent. Whereas the Uniform Code limits the convening of the court to "superior" competent authority, the
Manual extends the authority to "another" competent authority. In
declaring the supremacy of the statutory provision, the Court said emphatically:
"Article 36 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 50 USC Sec. 611, provides
that the President may prescribe rules of procedure, including modes of proof in
cases before courts-martial, provided they are not contrary to or inconsistent with
the provisions of the Code. This Article brings into the Code the oft-expressed
rule that the terms of a congressional enactment can not be defeated by terms
engrafted thereon by an executive order, and if the two are inconsistent, the statute
must stand alone. But, it imposes on this Court the duty to reconcile any conflicting
provisions dealing with the same subject matter and to construe them, in so far
as reasonably possible, so as to be in harmony with each other." 10

In construing"' the two provisions, the Court took cognizance of the
manifest intent of Congress to lessen command control and gave it
effect by limiting the wording of the Manual to meet the specifications
of the Uniform Code.
The rule in the LaGrange case was liberally applied by an Air Force
Board of Review to a somewhat analogous situation. In the Burnette
case,'2 the officer preferring the charges and the accuser in the case was
the commanding officer of the accused's Air Rescue Squadron, with the
rank of colonel. The charges were referred to trial by a special court
convened by order of the commanding officer of the Air Base Group,
who had the rank of lieutenant colonel and acted upon the record of
trial as convening authority. It appeared that the Air Rescue Squadron
was not under the command jurisdiction (i.e., operational control) of
the Air Base Group.' Following the LaGrange case, the Board of Re10. United States v. LaGrange et al. (No. 313), 1 USCMA 342, 3 CMR 76, 78 (1952).
11. The following rule of construction was announced: "Regulations and statutes are
to be construed with reference to their manifest object, and if the language Is susceptible of two constructions, one which will carry out and the other defeat that object,
they should receive the former construction." Id. at 78.
This rule was later applied in construing permissive language in the Manual as requiring mandatory instructions on lesser included offenses reasonably raised by the evidence,
Otherwise, a conflict between the Uniform Code and the Manual would result. United
States v. Clark (No. 190), 1 USCMA 201, 2 CMR 107, 110 (1952). A detailed study of
the evolution of military law requiring instructions has been made. See Fedele, The
Evolution of the Court-Martial System and the Role of the United States Court of Military Appeals in Military Law (SJJ). Thesis--The George Washington University Law
Library 1954).
12. ACM S-3033, Bumette, 5 CMR 522 (1952).
13. The Air Rescue Squadron was a unit assigned to and under the command jurlsdiction of a certain composite wing of the Strategic Air Command. The Air Base Group
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view held that the convening authority, being junior in rank to the
accuser and not in the chain of command, was disqualified to convene
the court thus rendering it without jurisdiction to try the accused. It
is to be noted that the Board of Review refused to depart from the
principle announced in the LaGrange case even though the instant case
on its facts differed from the former on two salient points. Unlike the
LaGrange case, the Squadron commander was not empowered to convene a special court. 14 Although it could be argued that this factor
removes the Squadron commander from the category of those officers
to whom the prohibition in Article 23(b) applies, the Board of Review
was unable to accept such a restrictive interpretation of the language
of the statute. 5 Furthermore, the charges in the instant case were forwarded by the squadron commander to the Air Base Group commander
as the officer exercising summary court-martial jurisdiction over the
squadron.' 6 Although this fact would indicate that the Air Base Group
commander was superior to the accuser in the chain of command in
court-martial matters, the Board of Review held that such a situation
was not sufficient to create an exception to the principle enunciated in
the LaGrange case.
An interesting question concerning the power of the President to prescribe a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Uniform Code
was presented in the case of United States v. Wappler.'7 Upon conviction by a Navy special court-martial in California, the accused was
sentenced to confinement at hard labor for sixty days; solitary confinement on bread and water, with a full ration every third day, for thirty
days; to forfeiture of $50.00 per month for three months; and to receive a bad conduct discharge. The convening authority, in approving
the sentence, suspended the punitive discharge with provision for its
automatic remission six months after termination of confinement. This
action having been approved by the supervisory authority, the record
of trial was reviewed by a Navy Board of Review. In a two to one decision, the Board of Review set aside the bad conduct discharge on the
ground that confinement on bread and water may not be legally imwas similarly assigned to and under the command jurisdiction of the same composite
wing. Ibid.
14. The Air Rescue Squadron was not a "separate squadron" within the purview of

Art. 23(a) of the Uniform Code, or a "separate or detached command" as defined in
paragraph 5b(3) MCM, 1951. Ibid.
15. Its position was founded on the clear Congressional intent to lessen command
control and influence in the military justice system, even though there was no evidence
of command control or influence in the case. Ibid.
16. M M 1951, par. 32f.
17. (No. 1457), 2 USCALA, 393, 9 CAIR 23 (1953).
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posed where a punitive discharge is also adjudged, but otherwise approved the remainder of the sentence. The dissenting member was of
the opinion that the court was without power to impose confinement on
bread and water. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy thereupon
certified the case to the Court of Military Appeals, requiring a consideration of the legality of bread and water confinement.
Inasmuch as paragraph 125 of the Manual specifically provides that
Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard courts-martial may impose confinement on bread and water 8 for periods not in excess of 30 days, with
the restriction that "no accused shall be deprived of a full ration for a
period longer than three consecutive days," the legality of the sentence
under consideration depended upon the presence or absence of any
conflict of the Manual provision with the Uniform Code. The only
mention made of confinement on bread, and water as punishment is
contained in Article 15(a) (2) of 'the Uniform Code which permits confinement on bread and water as nonjudicial punishment by commanding
officers but limits it to "a person attached to or embarked in a vessel"
and to "a period not to exceed three consecutive days." In addition Article 55 prohibits "cruel or unusual punishment." After examining the
legislative history to the Uniform Code on the matter of cruel punishments, 9 the Court concluded that it was not the Congressional intent
to give "free rein to the Chief Executive to authorize Naval courts-martial to impose bread and water confinement within its grant of power
to him to establish the maximum limits of sentence." Instead the Court
found a contrary intent in the language of Article 55, prohibiting "cruel
and unusual" punishments to bar confinement on bread and water, except
to the extent permitted by Article 15. In other words, it squarely
held that no court-martial, Navy or otherwise, may legally adjudge
confinement on bread and water for personnel other than those "attached
to or embarked in a vessel," but a court-martial of any service may
impose confinement on bread and water in cases involving personnel
"attached to or embarked in a vessel," for a "period not to exceed three
consecutive days." Speaking of the conflict between the provisions of
the Manual and the Uniform Code, the Court stated emphatically and
unequivocally:
18. Sentences to confinement on bread and water for Army and Air Force personnel
are expressly forbidden by the same paragraph.
19. Confinement on bread and water, with a full ration every third day for a period
up to thirty days, has been expressly permitted by the Articles for the Government of
the Navy for many years (Arts. 30, 35, AGN, and N. C. & B., Sec. 447). Such punishment has long been prohibited by the Army, and has never been recognized by the Air
Force. United States v. Wappler, supra note 17.
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"To the extent which paragraphs 125 and 127c of the Manual are in conflict vith
this construction of the Code, they are without sanction of law and must fall"eo

It is interesting to note that while the Manual test as to what constitutes a lesser offense had been applied with approval by the Court in
a number of instances2" it was rejected in a homicide case on the reasoning that the Manual rule was intended merely to furnish a working test
under Article 79, which test is "sound and workable in the overwhelming majority of cases, but it simply and badly fails in homicide-and,
to the extent that it conflicts with the intention of Article 79, it must

fail."722

In the leading case of United States v. Rosato" the Court later mani-

fested no hesitancy in declaring that the part of paragraph 150b of the
1951 Manual which provides that the prohibition against self-incrimination is not violated by requiring an accused to make a sample of his
handwriting, contravenes the privilege against self-incrimination secured to an accused through Article 31(a) of the Uniform Code and
the Fifth Amendment, is in conflict therewith, and therefore is of no
legal effect. The violation was based on the fact that the accused was
here required affirmatively to exercise both his mental and physical
faculties. This test was subsequently applied in the Greer case where
20. The Court went on to hold that the provision of paragraph 127c of the Manual
permitting the substitution of equivalent punishments, including confinement on bread and
water, on the basis there indicated for the punishments listed in the Table of Maximum
Punishments, "unless dishonorable or bad conduct discharge is adjudged," does not conflict with the Uniform Code. Accordingly, where a punitive discharge is imposed, the
court may not additionally sentence the accused to confinement on bread and water. The
Court thereupon set aside the bread and water confinement and affirmed the bad conduct
discharge. Ibid. Cf. United States v. Wyatt (No. 1140), 2 USCMA 647, 10 CMR 145
(1953), where the Court set aside the bad conduct discharge and affirmed the bread and
water sentence insofar as it covered a three day period.
21. This subject is more fully treated under the heading of "Lesser Offeses," Fedele,
The Evolution of the Court-Mlartial System and the Role of the United States Court of
Military Appeals in Military Law, c. 6 (S.J[D. Thesis--The George Washington University
Law Library 1954).
22. United States v. Davis (No. 646), 2 USCMA 505, 10 CMR 3, 7 (1953).
23. (No. 1375), 3 USCMA 143, 11 CMR 143 (1953) overruling ACAT 6458, Taylor,
10 C RI 669 (1953). Accord: United States v. Eggers (No. 1990), 3 USCM1A 191, 11
CMR 191 (1953).
24. United States v. Greer (No. 3155), 3 USCMA 576, 13 CIR 132 (1953). However,
the Court very recently held that the procuring of a urine specimen from an accused by
catheterizing was not violative of his rights against compulsory self-incrimination. United
States v. Booker (No. 3836), 4 USCMA 335, 15 CMR 335 (1954) (accused was conscious
and consented to the catheterization); United States v. Williamson (No. 389S), 4 USCMA
320, 15 CAIR 320 (1954)

(accused was unconscious).

Whether the taking of a blood sample from an accused against his will is violative of
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the Court likewise discarded that provision of paragraph 150b of the
1951 Manual providing that the privilege of self-incrimination is not
violated by requiring an accused to utter words for the purpose of voice
identification. Where, however, an inconsistency exists between provisions of the Manual, the provision which sets out the more stringent
rule and inclines to be more directly in favor of the accused, will prevail.25
In one instance the Court rejected a Manual provision even though
not in conflict with the Uniform Code. Notwithstanding the provision
of paragraph 73c of the Manual vesting complete and final control in
the law officer over requested additional instructions, a bitterly divided
Court declared that failure to give a specific request for clarifying
in20
structions is a clear abuse of discretion and constitutes error.
What status is enjoyed by the Manual in the absence of any inconsistency presents another facet of the subject matter under consideration. The Court was first presented with this problem in the case of
United States v. Lucas.2 7 There, the accused pleaded guilty to an offense
of "AWOL" and was found guilty thereof by a special court. The president of the court had failed to instruct and charge the court as to the elements of the offense, the rules of presumption of innocence, burden of
proof, reasonable doubt, and lesser degrees. Paragraph 73b of the
Manual provides that after instructing the court as to the elements of
each offense charged, the law officer in a general court or the president
in a special court shall in all cases, including those in which a plea of
guilty has been entered, charge the court on the four elements set forth
in Article 51(c) of the Uniform Code. It is to be noted that the Manual
requires the charge to be given in cases where a plea of guilty has been
entered, whereas the Uniform Code does not so require. In construing
the language of the Uniform Code and the Manual dealing with the
same subject matter, the Court held that in the absence of inconsistency, both function on the same authoritative level, and that the usual
rules of statutory interpretation which require that each be given effect
are applicable. 2' Thereupon, the Court went on to find that the subject
his right against compulsory self-incrimination has as yet not been answered by the

Court. Paragraph 150b of the Manual states that it is not.
25.
26.
27.

United States v. Whitman (No. 2168), 3 USCMA, 179, 11 CMR 179 (1953).
United States v. Offley et al. (No. 1841), 3 USCMA 276, 12 CMR 32 (1953).
(No. 7), 1 USCMA 19, 1 CMR 19 (1951).

28. "For the purpose of this case we can and do hold that the act of Congress (the
Code) and the act of the Executive (the Manual) are on the same level and that the
ordinary rules of statutory construction apply. In that event the general rule Is that
statutes dealing with the same subject should, if possible, be so construed that effect Is
given to every provision of each. Moreover, in dealing with each, its provisions should
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provisions of the Manual, not being prohibited by the Uniform Code,
were mandatory and that a failure to comply therewith was error as a
matter of law.29
In the later case of United States v. Merritt, 0the Court had occasion
to hold that the only limitation upon the President imposed by Article
36 of the Uniform Code is that his orders must be consistent with and
not contrary to the Uniform Code.3 '
be construed so that no part will be inoperative, superfluous, void or ineffective.'
States v. Lucas (No. 7), 1 USCA

United

19, 22, 1 CAM 19, 22 (1951).

Accordingly, no conflict was found in the following cases: United States v. Sonnenschein
(No. 8), 1 USCMA 64, 1 CAMR 64 (1951) (jurisdiction of Court to review caes transmitted to judicial Council prior to effective date of Uniform Code); United States v.
Martin (No. 51), 1 USCMA 82, 1 CAM 82 (1951) (same); United States v. Brasher (No.
499), 2 USCMA 50, 6 CAM 50 (1952) (limitation of period of forfeitures or confinement
in absence of punitive discharge): United States v. Ariola (No. 1849), 2 USCMA 637, 10
CMIR 135 (1953) (singleness of offense); United States v. Gann et al. (No. 1425); 3
USCAi.A 12, 11 CAR 12 (1953) (use of deposition in case involving capital and noncapital
offenses); United States v. Krull (No. 934), 3 USCMA 129, 11 CAR 129 (1953) (intention to replace property as a defense in larceny); United States v. Teague (No. 1719), 3
USCTA 317, 12 CMR 73 (1953) (legality of arrest pending completion of appellate
review); United States v. Cambridge (No. 1850), 3 USCLM 377, 12 CMR 133 (1953)
(ruling by law officer on stipulation); United States v. Seymour (No. 2728), 3 USCMA
401, 12 CMR 157 (1953) (admission-necessity of affirmative proof of warning of rights
under Article 31); United States v. Littrice (No. 2809), 3 USCMA 487, 13 CMR 43
(1953) (par. 38 of the Manual re command control not in conflict with Arts. 37 and
66 of the Uniform Code); United States v. Biesak (No. 2676), 3 USCMA 714, 14 CMR
132 (1954) (provisions in par. 122a of the Manual to effect that the presumption of
sanity is evidence to be considered along with other evidence is not in conflict with the
Uniform Code); United States v. White (No. 3068), 3 USCMA 666, 14 CMR 84 (1954)
(provisions in par. 143a of the Manual re Certificate of Identity of an accused are not
in conflict with the Uniform Code); ACM S-1852, Phillips, 2 CMR 671 (1951) (deferring of effective date of forfeitures by convening authority); ACM 4867, Godfrey, 3
CMR 752 (1952) (power of convening authority to specify effective date of forfeitures).
29. However, in view of the plea of guilty the error was held to be harmless.
30. (No. 53), 1 USCMA 56, 1 CMR 56 (1951), where it was held that if the accused
was arraigned after the effective date of the Uniform Code, the trial procedure prescribed
under the 1951 Manual governs even though the court was appointed and charges wre
referred to trial prior thereto.
31. CL United States v. Burns (No. 847), 2 USCLA. 400, 9 CMR 30 (1953), where
Rule IX F, of the Uniform Rules of Procedure for Proceedings in and before Boards
of Review, promulgated by the judge Advocates General of the Armed Forces pursuant
to Artiele 66 of the Uniform Code, permitting the Boards of Review to consider matters
outside the record of trial on the issue of insanity, was upheld and enforced as being "consistent with the Code and the Manual and good reasons support its enactment." See, also,
United States v. Drain (No. 4510), 4 USCMA 646, 16 CAR 220 (1954) where in holding
that a deposition in which the accused was represented by uncertified counsel was inadmissible in a- general court-martial, the Court "reconciled without the slightest difficulty" a claimed inconsistency between Article 49 and Article 27 of the Uniform Code.
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That the provisions of the Manual are both procedural and substantive in nature is axiomatic. In so far as all of the foregoing cases deal
with questions of adjective military law,32 the correctness of their holdings to the effect that the provisions of the Manual when not inconsistent with the Uniform Code shall have the full force and effect of
law cannot be seriously challenged. Such provisions are law-making in
nature and consequently mandatory in their applications. 3 However,
whether the Manual in toto, including the substantive law provisions
therein contained, is entitled to "all the force of law" is a question
which is not entirely free from legal doubt and uncertainty. 4
Article 36 of the Uniform Code empowers the President to make
rules governing the procedure, including modes of proof, for trials
before military tribunals in clear, precise and unambiguous language.
There is no express delegation of power to promulgate rules of substantive law, nor can such be reasonably inferred therein. The express
language of Article 36 clearly manifests a contrary intent, for Congress
"must not be taken to legislate by inference."3 5 Congress, being expressly conferred with the power under the Constitution to make rules for
the government and regulation of the land and naval forces,80 has in its
legislative wisdom seen fit not to delegate to the President the power
to declare rules of substantive military law. It is, therefore, submitted
that the substantive law37 provisions of the Manual, not falling within
the grant of authority of Article 36, are without sanction of law. As
such, they are purely informational and expositive in legal contemplation, and therefore not, of themselves, law-making in nature and, consequently, not mandatory in effect. Since the substantive law of the
military was declared by Congress in the Uniform Code of Military
justice, the President, whether acting as Chief Executive or as Commander in Chief, is powerless to add to, detract from, or in any way
modify the same.38
32. Those are provisions of the Manual which contain rules of evidence and other
rules of procedure for trial by court-martial as authorized by Article 36 of the Uniform
Code, and the maximum limits of punishment imposable in such trials as authorized by

Article 56 of the Uniform Code.
33. It has been long established that executive regulations have "the force of law."
Gratiot v. United States, 4 How. 80 (U.S. 1846); Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553
(1897); Ex parte Reed, 10 Otto. 13 (U.S. 1879); United States v, Webster, 28 Fed. Case.
510, No. 16,658 (D. Maine 1840).
34. See Connor, The judgmental leview in General Court-Martial Proceedings, 32
Va. L. Rev. 39, 67-76 (1945).
35. This significant language was used by the Court in the case of United States v.
Wappler (No. 1457), 2 USCMA 393, 9 CMR 23, 26 (1953).
36. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8.
37. See ACM 6613, D'Andrea, 10 CMR 909 (1953).
38. This limitation upon the President was expressly recognized by the Court when
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This problem is most strikingly manifested in the case of the United
States v. Solinsky 9 The accused had enlisted in the Army in August
1947. Prior to the normal expiration of his term of enlistment and while
stationed in Germany, he was, on September 5, 1949, given an honorable discharge for the "convenience of the Government" in order that he
might re-enlist for an indefinite period of time. His discharge was dated
September 5, 1949, and his reenlistment was effective the following day.
Thereafter, in 1951, he was tried and convicted of certain offenses allegedly committed in 1948. The findings and sentence having been approved by the convening authority and affirmed by an Army Board
of Review, the Court of Military Appeals granted accused's petition
for review to determine the sole question of whether the court-martial
had jurisdiction to try him for offenses committed during his prior
enlistment.
We have previously seen that courts-martial are courts of special and
limited jurisdiction and as such derive their power solely from Congressional grants. Also, that if the military had jurisdiction over the person at the time an offense was committed, the jurisdiction might be lost
by the giving of an honorable discharge unless Congress had specifically
reserved the right of the military to proceed.4 0 The general rule that
court-martial jurisdiction over persons subject to military law ceases
when discharge is effective and that jurisdiction as to the offenses committed during the period of service thereby terminated is not revived
by re-entry into the military service, 4 1 is subject to certain statutory
exceptions. Congress has seen fit to have courts-martial retain jurisdiction after the individual's discharge from service in the following cases
only:
1. Where the offense is punishable by confinement at hard labor for five years or
more, and for which the accused cannot be tried by civilian courts of the
42
United States.
it declared that if Congress proscribed but one offense in Article 132(1) (A) of the Uniform Code, the President cannot enlarge that Article to include three offenes by providing three forms of alleging violation of that Article. United States v. Ariola (No.
1849), 2 USCMA. 637, 10 CMR 135, 137 (1953).
39. (No. 594), 2 USCIA 153, 7 CMR 29 (1953).
40. The nature, extent, and scope of courts-martial jurisdiction is separately treated
elsewhere in the author's thesis.
41. United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949); ACM1 1937, Welty
(BR), 2 CIR (AF), 615 (1950); CM 324945 foore, 74 BR 37, 38 (1947); Winthrop,
Military Law and Precedents 93; MCM, 1951, par. 11a; MCM, 1949, par. 10; MICIM, 1928,
par. 10.
42. UC J, Art. 3(a). This provision was added to the Uniform Code as a result of
the Irschberg case, ibid., to "provide a desirable degree of continuing jurisdiction and at
the same time place sufficient limitations on the continuing jurisdiction to prevent ca-
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2. As to persons serving a sentence imposed by a court-martial.
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3. As to persons who obtain their discharge by fraud.
45
service.
the
4. As to persons who desert
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It is interesting to note that the Manual has engrafted the following
additional nonstatutory exception:
5. Where the person's discharge does not interrupt his status as a person belonging to the general category of persons subject to the Uniform Code. 40

The Court of Military Appeals, in a two to one decision giving full
force and effect to this nonstatutory jurisdictional provision of the
Manual,47 held that court-martial jurisdiction was not terminated upon
the accused's discharge from the service in 1949.48 Without making any
distinction between the procedural and substantive provisions in the
Manual," a the Court seems to have relied heavily, if not solely, upon
the fact that this provision was "first enacted by the promulgation" of
the 1928 Manual and "has been the law" for almost twenty-five years.
Its conclusion is reflected in the following significant language: "We,
therefore, believe the 1951 Manual is declaratory of what the law has
been since this type of discharge came into existence."50
It is submitted that the Manual provision under consideration deals
with a matter of substantive military law purely and simply. It represents an encroachment upon the legislative power of Congress. It, in
effect, is a nonstatutory enlargement of the jurisdiction of courts-martial and as such is patently illegal.5 ' Such was the position taken by
pridous actions on the part of military authorities." H.R. Rep. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 11 (1949); Sen. Rep. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949).
43. UCMJ, Art. 2(7).
44. UCMJ, Art. 3(b).
45. UCMJ, Art. 3(c).
46. MCM, 1951, par. 11b. A similar provision was contained in the MCM, 1949,
par. 10, and MCM, 1928, par. 10.
47. While admitting that the provisions of the 1949 Manual are controlling in this
case because the reenlistment of the accused was effective prior to the Uniform Code, the
Court pointed- out that the provision under consideration has been in other Manuals
in substantially the same form for a quarter of a century.
48. U.S. ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, supra note 41, was distinguished on its facts and
held not to be applicable here.
49. The traditional military view has always been that the Manual for Courts-Martial,
being "the bible of military justice," in toto enjoys "all the force of law." See note 6
supra.
50. (No. 594), 2 USCMA 153, 159, 7 CMR 29, 35 (1953). (Italics supplied).
51. It is most elementary that a court-martial, being a court of limited and special
statutory jurisdiction, has no jurisdiction beyond that expressly given by the statute conferring it. McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 Fed. Supp. 80 (ED. Va. 1943); VerMehren v,
Sermyer, 36 F. 2d 876 (8th Cir. 1929).
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Chief Judge Quinn who, in his short but pointed dissenting opinion,
sums up the grave weakness of the majority decision as follows:
"In my opinion, United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cook, . . . is controlling here.
I read Hlirshberg to say that once an enlisted man has been discharged from the
armed forces, that discharge operates as a bar to subsequent trial for offenses occurring prior to discharge, except in those situations expressly saved by applicable
statute. I find no statutory provision-and the majority cites none-that is applicable here.
"It is immaterial, I think, that there may be persuasive policy arguments in support of the result reached by the majority. We are here concerned with courtsmartial, special tribunals whose jurisdiction must be found solely within the confines of the statutes creating them. If jurisdiction
is not conferred by statute, then
52
it matters not that it should be conferred."

Although an Air Force Board of Review has recognized and admitted
in at least one case that the factual examples enumerated in the Manual
justifying an intent not to return in a desertion case are not and should
not be applied as "rules of law" but are mere "examples,115 s it is reasonably certain, in view of the Solinsky case and others, 4 that the Court
of Military Appeals as the military court of last resort has refused or
failed to recognize any distinction between the legal efficacy of substan52. United States v. Solinsky (No. 594), 2 USCMA 153, 161, 7 CAR 29, 37 (1953).
On similar facts and on the authority of the Solinsky case an Air Force Board of Review has recently rejected the contention that substantive jurisdictional provisions of the
Manual have no legal effect. See ACM 7944, Bridges, - CAR - (1954)., where, however, the conviction was reversed on another ground.
53. ACM 5427, Howe, 6 CMR 753, 758 (1952).
54. See United States v. Kirschner (No. 654), 1 USCMA 477, 4 CAR 69 (1952), where
effect was given to the provisions in the 1951 Manual recognizing negligent homicide as
an offense under the general catch-all article, Article 134. Also, United States v. Simmons (No. 505), 1 USCMA 691, 5 CAR 119 (1952), where one question presented was
whether knowledge on the part of the accused is an essential element to the offese of
willful disobedience in violation of Article 90 of the Uniform Code. Paragraph 169a
of the Manual provides that lack of such knowledge is a "defense.' After justifying the
essentiality of the element of knowledge, the Court in a dictum made the following suggestions: "We do, however, suggest to the services that the Manual for Courts-Martial,
United States, 1951, be corrected to show that in this type of offense knowledge is an
element which must be included in the proof." It is noteworthy that in this case the
Manual provision, though substantive in nature, is not in conflict with the Uniform
Code. In a surprising turn of events about six months following the Simmons case, the
Court gave its first
indication that it was going to discard the dictum of that case by
referring to knowledge as an "affirmative defense," rather than as an element of the
offense. United States v. Miller (No. 1021), 2 USCMA 194, 7 CAR 70 (1953). However, it was not until about three months later that the majority of the Court flatly
refused to declare whether knowledge was an "element" or an "affirmative defense," and
instead adopted a special "either or" rule. United States v. Wallace (No. 983), 2 USCMA
595, 10 CAM 93 (1953).
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tive and procedural rules promulgated by the Manual. It is giving full
force and effect to all provisions of the Manual, whether procedural or
not and without regard to the limited authorization of Article 36 of
the Uniform Code, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the Uniform Code. The only remaining remedy available to further test this
issue is the writ of habeas corpus. 5 As the Solinsky case clearly seems
to meet the very limited requirements of that remedy, it would be the
ideal case upon which to sue out such a writ. Whether this final step
will in fact be taken by the accused is a matter which merits future
attention.
The decisions of the United States Court of Military Appeals have
had a sobering effect upon the concept that the Manual for CourtsMartial, as the "bible" of military law, was infallible. While the Manual
was put on the same effective legal level as the Uniform Code, when
not inconsistent therewith, and thus given recognition as a source of
military law without distinguishing between the adjective and substantive provisions therein, at the same time, the notion that every provision therein is absolute law has been completely shattered.
In addition to giving legal efficacy to the Manual as a whole and in
particular to those provisions not inconsistent with the Uniform Code,
the decisions of the Court may be said to have had a bipartite effect
upon the Manual-that of rejecting those provisions conflicting with
the Uniform Code, and that of amplifying the Manual.
With regard to rejecting a Manual provision, the stand taken by the
Boards of Review has been that their function is "to apply and interpret" the provisions of the Manual. They maintain that they do not
have the power "to make law" and therefore cannot disregard, reject or
overrule the expressions in the ManualY0 Without going into the obvious fallacies in this line of reason, it is a foregone conclusion that this
position of the Boards of Review will not change. No amount of appellate advocacy seems to be able to persuade them otherwise. It seems
55.

Judgments of courts-martial are not directly reviewable by civil courts.

How-

ever, they are always open to collateral attack by review in habeas corpus proceedings
in a United States District Court for the sole purpose of determining the question of jurisdiction.
56. Since the Manual is a regulation promulgated by the President pursuant to his
order as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, members of the Boards of Review,
being part of the military establishment, feel that they have no alternative but to comply with the President's order. This military relationship poses a very fascinating ques.
tion, to wit: Would the members of a Board of Review, who in deciding a case rejected
a provision of the Manual as being illegal, be guilty of the offense of failing to obey
the regulations or orders of their Commander-in-Chief? While this problem seems to be
more academic than realistic, supporters of both sides of the issue can be found.
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that relief of this sort must in the final analysis be sought for and had
in the Court of Military Appeals where by virtue of its superior independent authority it can overrule the Boards of Review. Herein lies one of the
greatest needs for and accomplishments of a civilian military appellate
court. By declaring the law and supervising its application by inferior
military agencies, the Court of Military Appeals can insure that justice
in the military is a reality and not a fiction. It was by this process that
in a relatively few instances provisions of the Manual have been declared illegal.
By far the greatest effect of the Court on the Manual has been that
of adding to and amplifying its provisions. While the Manual provides a foundation for principles of military justice by implementing
the provisions of the, Uniform Code, it is by no means complete. In
building up a single, unified framework of the principles of military
criminal law,5 7 the Court has established a substantial body of substantive and adjective common law military with the result that it has
added to and engrafted upon a wide variety of subjects covered in practically every chapter in the Manual.
The largest single addition has been in the field of instructions.
This particularly troublesome subject has involved a disproportionately
large percentage of the Court's cases. Of the 392 decisions rendered
during the period under consideration, " 37.5 per cent or a total of 147
cases involved instructional questions. In this area, we have seen how
the Court, by the process of judicial legislation, has expanded the
"elements of the offense" to resemble more the "qaw of the case" by requiring mandatory instructions on lesser included offenses and certain
affirmative defenses directly touching one of the elements of the offense
charged, and by recognizing the right of defense counsel to request additional instructions. By the same token the Court has erected a framework of instructional rules varying somewhat from those prevailing on
the civilian side and designed to meet the "practical" exigencies of military requirements.
A large number of cases have involved the duties and responsibilities
of the law officer-now for the first time, divorced from participation
57. This constitutes one of the prime objectives of the United States Court of Military
Appeals. The extent to which this objective, plus others, has been met by the Court
is the subject of a study already made. See Fedele, The Evolution of the Court-Martial
System and the Role of the United States Court of M1ilitary Appeals in Military Law
(SJJD. Thesis-The George Washington University Law Library 1954).
58. The greatest contribution by the Court to military law both from a quantitative
and qualitative basis lies in the field of instructional law and is separately treated in
the parent dissertation. See note 57 supra.
59. From 31 Mlay 1951 to 3 October 1953.
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in the deliberations of the court-martial, and charged, in most essential
respects, with the duties of a civilian judge. Particularly troublesome
have been those cases dealing with the unauthorized presence of the
law officer in the closed session of the court-martial. 06
The cases involving rules of evidence have presented some of the
Court's most serious challenges.6 The chapter on evidence in the Manual
presents little more than a guide to those involved in trying cases, and
certainly does not settle many of the issues that arise and ultimately
reach the Court. So also, the officer with no legal training participating
in special courts cannot be expected to grasp the complexities and refinements of the rules of evidence. It is in this area that brings to the
Court some of its most difficult tasks.
A large portion of the Court's opinions were concerned with almost
every facet of the jurisdictional field. The remaining opinions have involved various matters, some very minor from the point of view of
establishing a substantive body of law, and others undoubtedly of great
importance, such as the duty to retreat in self-defense. 2
The net effect of all these decisions was to add to, delete from, and
modify the provisions of the Manual to such a substantial degree as to
amount to a complete revision thereof. The decisional influence of the
United States Court of Military Appeals has been so great that the
Army and the Air Force have already not only published a pocket
supplement to the Manual, 3 but have also issued pamphlets designed
to assist and guide the law officer 4 in the execution of the newly imposed, highly technical requirements of military law. Military law has,
with the advent of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the United
States Court of Military Appeals, finally become of age. It is now a
highly specialized branch of our American legal jurisprudence. The
days when the Manual represented the supreme and only authority,
for all practical purposes, in military law and constituted the sole
working tool for the military practitioner are now behind us forever.
60. An analytical study of this subject is separately treated in the parent work. See
note 57 supra.
61. A detailed treatment of this subject is beyond the scope of the parent study.
62. United States v. Troglin (No. 1960), 3 USCMA 385, 12 CMR 141 (1953).
63. MCM, 1951, U.S. Army 1953 Cumulative Pocket Part; MCM, 1951, U.S. Air
Force 1953 Annual Pocket Part.
64. Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 27-9, Military Justice Handbook: The Law
Officer, December, 1952; Department of the Air Force, The Judge Advocate General,
Court-Martial Instructions Drafting Guide, 15 June 1954.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Published in March, June and December
VOLUME XXIII

DECEMBER, 1954

NUMBER 3

Subscription price, $2.00 Per year

Single issue, Seventy-five cents

Edited by the Students of the Fordham University School of Law
EDITORIAL BOARD

JouN A.

A fMMl

Editor-in-Chief
EL~um P. Disraro
Recent Decisions Editor

E. Hu~uno, Jn.
Comments Editor

ROYAL

Do:;Am T. Kux
Business Manager

JOHN D. HERTz
Book Review Editor

Associate Editors
BEmARa

S. BERGm.&N

ROBERT CEDAR

WnrA-Ms C. CO.'MELY
SAnmL J. DAis, JR.
GImEn
r E. Dwxa
BARmOroow
Eam
FRAscis X. CoNwAY

JOHN C. FRcICAo

PA RC= J. MUuu.r;
DonrzD J. MuLvnImL
PATnrcA A. O'B=.i;
Faacics B. RuscEr
RAY Eo:ND F. SCurLY
Frtzcs J. Yolc;

JmAxxs F. Gi,, JR.
EDWARD T. LOUcUISA
WnLIAM N. MAr3S
JonN H. McDo.NAw

Faculty Advisors
F. MANNING

Joi; E. McAmn

LEoFNARD

EDITORIAL AND GExnmA

OrrCcES, 302 BROADWAY, NEW Yomn

7, N.Y.

CoYMBUroaS TO TMS IssuE
CLYDE BARO-E, A.B., 1941, Juniata College; MS., 1942, Columbia University; LL.B, 1952,
Fordham University School of Law; LL., 1953, Columbia University School of Law.
F. CosTAzo, S.J., A.B., 1937, Georgetown University; A., 1939, Ph.D, 1949,
Fordham University. Professor of Political Philosophy at Georgetown University,
Washington, D.C. Author of GRA co-Rors., PoLarr , 20 Ford. L. Rev. 119 (19SI);
CAnonic PomIA I, 21 Ford. L. Rev. 91 (1952); CATHoac: PoLHYIA II, 21 Ford. L.

Josher

Rxv. 236 (1952); Jummic

ORIGINS Or REPansETATIO.N

I, 22 Ford. L. Rev. 123 (1954).

S. DORE, A.B., 1907, The College of St. Francis Xavier, A.M, 1911, St. Joseph's
College; LL.B., 1921 Fordham University School of Law; LL.D., 1928, Fordham
University, LL.D., 1930 Holy Cross College; J.C.D., 1931, St. Joseph's College. Member of The New York Bar. Retired Associate Justice, Appellate Division, Supreme
Court; State of New York, First Department. Author of HumM Riomrs &.D TAE
LAW, 15 Ford. L. Rev. 3 (1946).

EDWARD

FPa-sx FDrEr., B.B.A., 1939, The College of the City of New York; LL.B., 19$2, Fordham University School of Law; LL.M, 1951, New York University School of Law;
S.J.D., 1954, The George Washington University School of Law.

